

# Beyond the Bottle

A commercial case for recurring value in fragrance

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For industrial fragrance leaders, brand owners and commercial  
budget holders

**The opportunity is to earn the next purchase before it becomes  
another price comparison.**

**Ole Sandner**

sandner.tech

Consumer change / Service economics / Circular value

# Build the relationship around use

Dear industry leader,

Fragrance carries emotional value, identity and discovery. Yet a large part of its commercial infrastructure still measures success at the transaction: distribution achieved, units shipped, a promotion converted. That model can produce growth while leaving the customer relationship, the next purchase and the cost of retaining demand largely outside the manufacturer's control.

My proposition is to examine the revenue model around fragrance with the discipline used in commercial technology transformation. The question is whether an ongoing offer can create enough customer value to support repeat participation, profitable service and a recoverable lifecycle. That requires commercial design before technical selection.

This paper argues for a selective transition, not an industry-wide replacement of bottle sales. Prestige, gifting, collecting and signature scents remain valuable. Recurring offers should earn a place where customers value continuity, access, guidance or convenience. They must demonstrate incremental contribution after acquisition, fulfilment, service, capital and recovery costs.

The decision I invite is a sponsored feasibility programme with explicit stop criteria. Establish the customer problem, compare a recurring offer with the existing purchase journey, and measure paid behaviour. Protect the core business while testing whether a second revenue engine deserves investment.

**A recurring contract is valuable only when the customer has a recurring reason to stay.**

Ole Sandner

Technology leadership and commercial transformation

sandner.tech

Scope: a commercial thesis, not a product specification. Market findings, author interpretation and illustrative economics are identified separately. No partner commitments or technical implementation are presented.

# Growth and value capture can diverge

A growing fragrance category does not guarantee improving economics for every participant. McKinsey's June 2026 analysis expects the global core beauty market to grow about 5% annually through 2030 and reports that fragrance has overtaken colour cosmetics as the third-largest core category. Its global channel model assigns 28% of beauty sales to e-commerce, including retailer websites, marketplaces and social commerce. These are beauty-wide figures and forecasts, not a fragrance subscription market estimate. [1]

The investment case therefore starts with value capture. Who funds discovery? Who controls the repeat purchase? Who carries inventory and service risk? Who receives the margin after channel fees and promotional spending? A brand can gain sales while losing control of those variables.

## Three propositions to test

First, customers may want different fragrances across occasions without wanting the friction or capital commitment of every conventional purchase. Second, an ongoing relationship may improve repeat contribution if the offer is genuinely used and valued. Third, coordinated service and material recovery may reduce avoidable lifecycle waste. Each is a hypothesis; none follows automatically from category growth.

The proposed commercial response is a portfolio of buying options, not compulsory subscription. Transactional retail can serve gifting and ownership. A well-designed recurring relationship can serve repeat use. Assisted discovery can connect the two. The operating model should let customers move between them without punitive barriers.

## Do not confuse category momentum with a defensible customer relationship.

For a budget owner, success is incremental contribution and a credible path to cash recovery. For a consumer, success is useful choice and dependable service at a fair total cost. The model must satisfy both.

# Use cohorts as a lens, not a prediction

The age bands below are ages reached during calendar 2026; before a birthday an individual is one year younger. Boomers, Gen X and Millennials follow commonly used Pew boundaries. This paper uses 1997-2012 for Gen Z and 2013-2024 for emerging Gen Alpha as working conventions. Alpha boundaries are disputed; no universal scientific cutoff exists. [2]

| Cohort           | Birth years | Age reached in 2026 | Commercial lens             |
|------------------|-------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Baby Boomers     | 1946-1964   | 62-80               | Trust and accessible choice |
| Generation X     | 1965-1980   | 46-61               | Time and reliable value     |
| Millennials      | 1981-1996   | 30-45               | Convenience and flexibility |
| Generation Z     | 1997-2012   | 14-29               | Discovery and low friction  |
| Generation Alpha | 2013-2024   | 2-13                | Parent mediated demand      |

These commercial lenses are design hypotheses, not measured traits of every cohort. Income, life stage, mobility, country and product familiarity can explain more than a generational label. A single cross-sectional survey cannot separate age effects from enduring cohort effects. Pew explicitly recommends attention to these distinctions. [3]

## Where respondents report spending more




Figure 1. Share of respondents saying they spend more in-store / online, not share of retail expenditure. Adyen/Censuswide: 2,001 US adults, fielded September-November 2024, published January 2025. Published source cohorts are retained; they are not re-aged or recut into this paper's 2026 bands. Unshown respondents are neither category. [4]

The implication is coexistence. The store and the screen serve different jobs; the commercial design must follow the job rather than the stereotype.

# Preserve trust while removing friction

## Baby Boomers | 62-80 in 2026

An older customer is not necessarily an offline customer. Eurostat reports online purchasing among 53% of EU internet users aged 65-74 in 2024. This excludes people older than 74 and people not using the internet; it cannot be treated as a rate for all Boomers. [5] Physical advice, digital replenishment and family-assisted buying can coexist.

For fragrance, a useful Boomer proposition may centre on confidence: authentic supply, familiar quality, clear pricing and a person who can resolve a problem. Retail design should allow unhurried comparison, legible information and optional assistance. A prestige counter can strengthen trust; pressured selling, inaccessible layouts or unclear offers can weaken it. These are customer-experience risks to test, not evidence that high-street retail universally alienates older buyers.

A recurring offer should explain the full commitment in ordinary language. Provide a purchase alternative, dependable customer support and a simple way to pause or leave. Do not assume that brand familiarity means willingness to enter a new commercial contract. Income, health and household circumstances vary widely across this age range.

## Generation X | 46-61 in 2026

Gen X spans customers managing careers, households and, for some, care responsibilities. A plausible design priority is time saved without sacrificing control. In the US Adyen survey, 48% of Gen X respondents reported spending more in-store and 28% more online; this describes reported channel preference, not wallet allocation. [4]

A fragrance journey for this segment should make research, sampling, fulfilment and support feel connected. Preserve consultation when the choice is unfamiliar; make a known repeat purchase easy. A store visit should provide a benefit beyond collecting a box.

For recurring revenue, test whether convenience exceeds the burden of another bill. Show price against realistic use, allow cadence changes and make problem resolution dependable. Household-level utility may matter more than novelty. Measure willingness to pay, actual use and retention separately; expressed interest is insufficient.

**Trust is a commercial asset. It should survive the transition from purchase to service.**

# Offer flexibility with a reason to return

## Millennials | 30-45 in 2026

For Millennials, the commercial hypothesis is convenient continuity with financial control. The group is now well into adult purchasing life, but household formation, housing costs and career trajectories differ. In Deloitte's 2025 global survey, 46% of Millennials said they did not feel financially secure. The study uses different cohort boundaries from this paper and measures financial sentiment, not fragrance affordability. [6]

Test transparent total cost, selectable cadence, useful discovery and an uncomplicated exit. A subscription must outperform the alternative of buying when needed. Excess supply is not value, and an annual commitment does not prove loyalty. A store can remain the place to evaluate an unfamiliar scent, with digital channels carrying the ongoing relationship.

## Generation Z | 14-29 in 2026

Gen Z includes both minors and independent adult buyers. Treat those populations separately. Digital familiarity does not eliminate demand for physical experience: the Adyen study reports weekly store shopping by 73% of its 18-27-year-old respondents, versus 65% of Boomers. These are all-retail US findings, not fragrance-specific conversion rates. [4]

There is a category-specific reason to examine variety. McKinsey's 2025 beauty research describes Gen Z engagement with fragrance as mood-related, layered and occasion-dependent, with those behaviours spreading to older customers. This supports testing different use occasions; it does not establish demand for a particular technical solution or subscription. [7]

A younger customer's attraction to discovery may coexist with a limited budget and easy brand switching. Deloitte reports financial insecurity among 48% of its Gen Z sample. [6] Design an entry offer that is understandable, useful and affordable on its own merits. Avoid relying on promotional novelty to disguise weak repeat value.

For adult Gen Z cohorts, compare social discovery, assisted store discovery and referral as acquisition paths. Follow each path through paid retention and contribution. A channel that converts quickly may still produce customers who churn before acquisition costs are recovered.

**Novelty can win attention. Repeat usefulness must win retention.**

# Separate emerging influence from spending power

## Generation Alpha | approximately 2-13 in 2026

Alpha is an emerging influence group rather than a mature autonomous purchasing segment. Under this paper's working definition, all are minors. This paper makes no numerical forecast of Alpha fragrance expenditure or subscription adoption. Reliable longitudinal evidence is still limited and cohort boundaries vary.

The immediate buyer is generally a parent or guardian. Distinguish the child's influence on discovery from the adult's control of suitability, budget and payment. Future expectations of connected shopping are a strategic consideration, but not a basis for monetising children or assuming adult beauty behaviours will persist unchanged.

Near-term research should therefore centre on adult households: what is appropriate, what the family buys, how gifting works and which channels they trust. Any future youth-related work requires age-appropriate design and specialist review. Treat Alpha as a horizon for learning, not an acquisition target in the initial business case.

## Online purchasing crosses age boundaries



Figure 2. EU internet users buying goods or services online in the previous 12 months, 2024. Eurostat age groups, not generations; the 25-64 group spans multiple cohorts. Rates are not a share of spending and exclude non-internet users. [5]

## Design around the moment

Across generations, discovery asks for confidence; selection asks for fit; payment asks for clarity; replenishment asks for convenience; exit asks for fairness. A repeat relationship earns its place when it makes those moments better. Segment by desired outcome and observed behaviour, then use age to improve accessibility and relevance.

# Compete on value the channel cannot flatten

Amazonization is used here as shorthand for marketplace expectations: abundant choice, searchable comparison, ratings, convenient fulfilment and low purchasing effort. It is an analytical label, not a claim that one company caused every retail change. Those expectations make an interchangeable offer easier to compare on price.

Marketplace access has benefits: reach, fulfilment capability and the ability to capture existing demand. It also has a cost structure. Amazon's 2025 annual report separately identifies seller services, including commissions and related fulfilment and shipping fees, and advertising services. The manufacturer's own channel model must establish the relevant cost per order rather than infer a universal marketplace margin. [8]

## How commoditization reaches the income statement

When the same offer appears across many outlets, promotion and fulfilment become more visible than brand difference. Price matching reduces realised revenue; paid visibility increases acquisition expense; returns and delivery expectations add cost. This is a causal model to investigate with company data, not a measured claim that every marketplace transaction destroys margin.

High-street retail has a different risk: asking the customer to spend time without providing enough confidence, relevance or enjoyment. Limited assortment, waiting and disconnected customer records can make a visit feel costly. Conversely, expert curation and sensory discovery can make a store distinctive. A physical location earns its economics when it improves conversion, basket contribution or subsequent retention enough to cover its cost.

The strategic answer is to connect discovery with the continuing relationship. Retail partners should receive fair credit for customers they help acquire, even when subsequent transactions use another channel. Permissioned data, agreed attribution and a service role can reduce conflict. The recurring offer should complement retailers where they add value, rather than subsidise demand that simply migrates elsewhere.

**Measure the contribution of the relationship, including the cost of the channel that created it.**

# Small revenue changes can remove large profits

The reference strategy workshop correctly directs attention to maturity: intensifying price competition can reduce profit before revenue visibly collapses. Its historical printing-sector examples are useful analytical inspiration, not evidence of current fragrance margins. The figure below is a fresh, explicitly illustrative calculation. [9]

## A 5% revenue decline can mean a 70% profit decline

Revenue at top; profit labelled in gold. EUR thousands.




Figure 3. Illustrative income statement in EUR thousands. Baseline: revenue 1,000, cost of goods 600, other operating costs 300, profit 100. With unchanged units and costs, a 5% realised-price reduction leaves profit 50. If other operating costs also rise by 20, profit becomes 30. No industry forecast or company actuals.

The mechanism is operating leverage. A EUR 50,000 revenue reduction flows directly through contribution if the physical volume and cost base remain unchanged. A further EUR 20,000 of acquisition or fulfilment expense then removes another fifth of the original profit. In this example, revenue is down 5%, but operating profit is down 70%.

## Why transformation must start before decline

A mature core business can fund experimentation, provide customer access and supply operational credibility. Waiting until it is cash-constrained makes capability development harder. Equally, declaring a recurring business successful because it grows revenue can conceal discounts, subsidised capital or unallocated service costs.

Maintain separate core and experimental income statements, with an explicit bridge for shared resources. Report cannibalised contribution, incremental acquisition cost and cash deployed. A second revenue engine should improve combined economics after transition costs, not merely relocate existing sales into a different accounting category.

**The transition is justified by incremental lifetime contribution, not the percentage of sales labelled recurring.**

# Turn delivery capability into a service business

Commercial technology channels combine manufacturers, distributors, integrators, service providers and financing specialists. Their transferable discipline is orchestration: identifying an outcome, pricing a contract, assigning delivery obligations, financing the lifecycle and managing renewal. This is a business-model analogy, not proof that a printing-sector structure should be transplanted unchanged into fragrance.

| Model              | Customer pays for            | Primary economic test                  |
|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Product sale       | Ownership at purchase        | Order contribution and repeat rate     |
| Membership         | Access or defined privileges | Paid use and voluntary renewal         |
| Replenishment plan | Convenient repeat supply     | Cadence fit and fulfilment cost        |
| Managed service    | A continuing agreed outcome  | Service contribution and delivery risk |
| Usage based        | Measured consumption         | Metering trust and revenue variability |

A managed service differs from a subscription payment schedule. It includes a continuing obligation: support, availability, replenishment, reporting or another defined outcome. Consumer membership and industrial service contracts also differ in procurement, sales cycles and renewal behaviour. Model B2C and B2B separately.

## Allocate risk before selecting partners

Specify the contract holder, customer relationship owner, billing party, service lead, capital provider and recovery owner. Agreements must define failures, escalation, inventory exposure, data permissions and the route out of the service. No current technology partner is presumed.

The historical regional business-case deck links direct enterprise engagement with partner delivery and governance. That is a useful principle: one coherent customer promise can depend on several organisations, but accountability must be legible. [\[10\]](#)

Channel remuneration should reward paid activation, delivered service and durable retention, with clear treatment of refunds and cancellations. A commission paid solely at contract signature can encourage low-quality acquisition. Geography and contract size determine whether local delivery capability adds enough value to justify its cost.

# Account for the whole cost of continuity

A recurring model moves cash and risk through time. It may require customer acquisition, onboarding, inventory or service-enabling capital before enough recurring contribution arrives. Growth can therefore consume cash even when an individual customer eventually becomes profitable. The metrics below must be reported by acquisition cohort and offer, not only as company averages.

| Measure              | Decision-useful definition                                                                        |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CAC                  | Acquisition spend / new paying activated customers; include channel fees, trials and sales effort |
| Attach               | Paid activations / eligible base; report denominator and observation window                       |
| Monthly contribution | Net revenue less supply, delivery, payment, partner and variable support costs                    |
| Churn and retention  | Separate customer churn, revenue churn, voluntary exit and failed-payment loss                    |
| Lifetime value       | Expected discounted contribution, less lifecycle costs; not lifetime revenue                      |
| Capital recovery     | Time until cohort cash recovers CAC, onboarding and initial capital                               |
| Profitability        | Contribution after fixed costs, depreciation and financing where applicable                       |

Attach can decline when a pilot expands beyond enthusiasts or when channel incentives weaken. This is a risk to model, not a universal empirical law. Report both immediate and delayed activation. If capital is deployed to the whole eligible base, dividing it only by customers who attach exposes the true burden.

Retention is not synonymous with lock-in. A contract can retain revenue while customers stop using the service; renewal then becomes vulnerable. Track active use, satisfaction, service failures, pause, downgrade and cancellation reasons. In B2B, one large cancellation can dominate revenue retention even when customer retention looks healthy.

Net revenue retention includes expansion, contraction and churn within an existing cohort. New acquisition should not inflate it. Track gross retention as well, and distinguish reactivations from continuously retained customers.

**The best leading indicator is continued customer value. The financial proof is recovered cash and positive contribution.**

# Retention can rescue or break the model

Consider an illustrative activated customer: EUR 30 monthly net revenue; EUR 18 variable supply, fulfilment, payment and support cost; EUR 12 monthly contribution. CAC is EUR 80, initial service capital EUR 100 and onboarding EUR 20: EUR 200 invested at activation. Values exclude tax, fixed overhead, financing, discounting, recovery cost and residual value. They are assumptions, not market benchmarks.

## Expected cash recovery per activated customer

EUR; lines show constant monthly customer churn assumptions




Figure 4. Expected cumulative contribution minus EUR 200 initial investment over 36 months; monthly survival  $(1 - c)^{(t-1)}$ , no reactivation or expansion. Constant monthly churn  $c$  is illustrative. At month 36: approximately +EUR 164 at 1%, +EUR 66 at 3%, and -EUR 22 at 6%.

Without churn, simple payback is  $200 / 12 = 16.7$  months. With constant churn, expected cash recovery takes about 19 months at 1% and 23 months at 3%; at 6%, the cohort remains negative at 36 months. The infinite-horizon, undiscounted contribution approximation is  $m / c$ : EUR 1,200, EUR 400 and EUR 200 respectively. Subtracting EUR 200 leaves EUR 1,000, EUR 200 and zero before omitted costs. At 6%, eventual break-even is only approached, not reached in a finite horizon.

## Attach and capital timing are as important as churn


If EUR 100 of capital is committed per eligible prospect before attachment, a 40% attach rate makes capital EUR 250 per activated customer; 20% makes it EUR 500. Adding the same CAC and onboarding raises initial investment to EUR 350 or EUR 600. At 3% churn, the EUR 400 infinite-horizon contribution leaves just EUR 50 or a EUR 200 loss before other costs.

Capital committed after paid activation avoids that specific denominator effect, but not returns, idle inventory or redeployment losses. Budget the maximum cohort cash deficit and financing capacity. Scaling faster than cash recovery is a financing decision, not simply a sales success.

# Retain value through a governed lifecycle

The Value Retention Ladder below is an original operating framework that aligns commercial continuity with recoverable value. It prioritises continued use, then qualified redeployment, before material recovery. It draws on the general circular-economy principle of retaining products and materials at high value, with explicit commercial accountability at every stage. [11]

## THE VALUE RETENTION LADDER



**Control layer: ownership • quality • cash recovery • verified impact**

Figure 5. Original framework by Ole Sandner / sandner.tech. Each route is conditional on suitability, quality assurance and demonstrable net benefit. Arrows express decision paths, not a technical architecture or guaranteed environmental outcome.

The commercial layer makes circularity investable. Assign an owner to every recoverable asset or material stream. Establish collection terms, traceability, inspection criteria, service life and a funded recovery reserve. Where repair or reuse is unsuitable, choose the next defensible route. Do not assume that packaging, residual fragrance and durable assets share the same recovery process.

Circularity is not automatically environmental improvement. Return transport, cleaning, losses and additional consumption can outweigh savings. Compare the full lifecycle with a clearly defined conventional baseline, using a functional unit such as a year of equivalent customer use. Report transport assumptions, return rates and sensitivity to utilisation.

Financial recovery value should be net of collection, inspection, processing and remarketing costs, discounted for delay and failure. Environmental reporting should separately measure virgin-material displacement, waste, energy and greenhouse-gas effects. A better balance sheet does not establish a lower footprint.

**The eco equation closes only when retention of value and reduction of impact are both measured.**

# Align the organisation with the promise

An ongoing offer cannot be governed as a succession of disconnected product sales. It needs commercial, financial and operational accountability across the customer lifecycle. The supplied organisational-alignment deck suggests useful questions about governance, capability, incentives and measurement; its placeholder content is not treated as validated company evidence. [12]

| Readiness gate      | Evidence required before advancing                                                     |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Customer problem    | Paid demand from a defined adult segment; an explicit transactional alternative        |
| Economic design     | Cohort contribution, attach, cash deficit and downside sensitivity agreed with finance |
| Delivery capability | Service standards, trained staff, escalation, inventory and support ownership          |
| Channel alignment   | Customer attribution, renewal economics and partner obligations contracted             |
| Lifecycle control   | Return and recovery routes costed; quality and environmental baselines defined         |

## Protect the core while building the new model

A practical sequence is discovery, a bounded pilot and then a funded scale decision. Avoid a premature fixed-cost platform. Begin with a narrow customer segment and an offer whose service promise can be delivered consistently. Make the existing purchase route the comparator, including its repeat purchase economics.

Sales incentives should balance acquisition with retention and contribution. Finance should own the cash model; operations should own service performance; commercial leadership should own customer value and channel alignment. The executive sponsor resolves trade-offs rather than allowing each function to optimise a different metric.

A monthly cohort review should connect complaints and delivery failures with usage, churn and cash recovery. Aggregate recurring revenue alone is insufficient. Maintain a separate experimental budget and show when existing profitable purchases have been displaced.

**Maturity is demonstrated by repeatable delivery and measurable economics, not by the sophistication of the technology.**

# Sponsor a disciplined feasibility programme

The first commitment should be a decision-quality programme, not an undisclosed product build. A proposed 90-day sequence can establish whether the commercial hypothesis is strong enough to justify a longer, paid retention pilot. Ninety days cannot validate multi-year lifetime value.

| Period     | Work and decision output                                                                                                                                  |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Days 1-30  | Choose one adult customer segment and use occasion. Map current economics and interview buyers and retail partners. Agree comparator and demand evidence. |
| Days 31-60 | Test paid willingness to participate. Model CAC, attach, service costs, capital and recovery. Establish delivery and channel accountability.              |
| Days 61-90 | Present a costed pilot plan, downside cases and funding ceiling. Agree retention observation period and explicit stop or redesign rules.                  |

Scale criteria should include incremental contribution over the comparator, acceptable cash exposure, repeat use, credible retention and deliverable service. Set numerical thresholds before testing, using the sponsor's risk tolerance and actual costs. Stop or redesign if demand requires persistent subsidy, service failure erodes trust, or lifecycle recovery is economically or environmentally implausible.

## Why I bring this perspective

My experience spans worldwide cloud services and enterprise transformation, EMEA managed services and XaaS transformation, and founder-led executive advisory work in destination experience and AI digital twins. The following profile sets out how that experience informs the commercial opportunity. [13,14]

I propose to help a sponsoring leadership team frame the customer opportunity, construct the end-to-end commercial case and align the capabilities needed to test it. The work begins with value, economics and accountability; technical options follow once the requirements are clear.

## The invitation: a focused executive discussion with the person accountable for growth, margin and the investment decision.

Contact Ole Sandner at [bonjour@sandner.tech](mailto:bonjour@sandner.tech) to initiate the feasibility discussion. Bring a commercial sponsor and a finance counterpart; leave with a defined feasibility question and an agreed next decision. Further reading: [sandner.tech/beyondthebottle.html](https://sandner.tech/beyondthebottle.html).

# Experience in commercial transformation

Ole Sandner brings technology, channel and service-model experience to the question of how fragrance businesses can create continuing customer value. His work spans founder-led executive advisory, worldwide cloud services and enterprise transformation, and regional managed-services and XaaS development. [13,14]

## Founder & CEO and Executive Advisor

Destination Experience and AI Digital Twins | Sophia Antipolis | April 2018-present. His advisory work connects business ecosystems, established business-model transformation and technology with commercial experience. For Beyond the Bottle, the relevant perspective is the relationship between a physical encounter, its digital continuity and an investable commercial model. [14]

## Worldwide Cloud Services and Enterprise Transformation

HP | January 2020-December 2025. Worldwide cloud-services and enterprise-transformation work followed EMEA XaaS expansion. His experience includes managed print cloud services, AI-enabled workflows, subscription programmes and collaboration with sales and partner channels. This informs service orchestration, commercial accountability and the challenge of scaling recurring offers across enterprise customers. [13,14]

## EMEA Managed Services and XaaS Transformation

HP | August 2017-December 2019. EMEA transformation work addressed a regional environment with diverse partner models, contracts and routes to market. The commercial relevance is aligning those moving parts around a coherent customer promise: partner enablement, contract design, fulfilment obligations and a service model that can be delivered consistently. [14]

Earlier experience includes technical consulting and systems analysis at Xerox (1984-1998), with research, systems integration and Nordic channel support. His later Ricoh-era strategy materials address mature-market margin pressure, managed-services migration and regional business-model development. [9,10,13] This connects engineering understanding with the economics and governance of commercial transformation.

**I connect the customer proposition with the revenue model, channel capabilities and operating discipline required to deliver it.**

Executive discussion and feasibility sponsorship

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[sandner.tech/beyondthebottle.html](https://sandner.tech/beyondthebottle.html)

HP is identified solely as a former employer. This paper does not represent HP, its endorsement or a technology partnership.

# Evidence and interpretation

Research reviewed 12 October 2026. Bracketed references identify source-supported facts; commercial recommendations and frameworks are author analysis. Survey findings describe their stated geography and population. No chart merges different surveys, recuts respondent cohorts or forecasts fragrance subscription adoption.

**[1] McKinsey. From aisle to algorithm: The beauty categories, channels, and concepts shaping 2030 growth.**

18 June 2026. Proprietary Global Beauty Market Model 2026; current prices and exchange rates fixed to 2025.

Market-wide forecasts, not certainty.

[Open source](#)

**[2] Pew Research Center. Where Millennials end and Generation Z begins.**

17 January 2019. Supports common Boomer, Gen X and Millennial conventions and Gen Z start. Gen Z endpoint and Alpha band are this paper's working conventions.

[Open source](#)

**[3] Pew Research Center. Assessing the effects of generation using age-period-cohort analysis.**

22 May 2023. Methodological basis for distinguishing age, period and cohort effects.

[Open source](#)

**[4] Adyen / Censuswide. How Gen Z is reimagining retail and the future of the store.**

22 January 2025. 2,001 US consumers older than 18; September-November 2024 fieldwork. Source age cohorts and self-reported channel preference; cohort sample sizes and confidence intervals not provided in the article.

[Open source](#)

**[5] Eurostat. Digitalisation in Europe 2025 edition.**

Online shopping section; 2024 EU ICT household and individual survey. Percentages relate to internet users and purchases in the previous 12 months. Published age bands differ from generational bands.

[Open source](#)

**[6] Deloitte Global. 2025 Gen Z and Millennial Survey.**

14 May 2025. 23,482 respondents in 44 countries; online fieldwork 25 October-24 December 2024. Gen Z sample born 1995-2006; Millennials 1983-1994. Financial sentiment is contextual, not retail purchase evidence.

[Open source](#)

Figures 1-2 redraw published numeric findings without reproducing publisher artwork. Figures 3-4 are illustrative calculations. Figure 5 is an original conceptual framework. Source notes travel with every figure.

# Provenance and analytical limits

## [7] McKinsey. A close look at the global beauty industry in 2025.

28 August 2025. Research discussion referring to 15,000 consumers and 100-plus executives. Qualitative fragrance behaviour commentary; not a causal estimate or subscription-demand measure.

[Open source](#)

## [8] Amazon. 2025 Annual Report.

Fiscal year ended 31 December 2025. Revenue classification notes identify seller commissions, fulfilment/shipping and advertising services. Used to explain channel cost categories, not fragrance seller fee rates.

[Open source](#)

## [9] Ole Sandner supplied reference. Day Two of Pixel Strategy workshop 2013.

OSA 03-03-2013 V1.3. Slides 7-9, 11, 16 and 18: lifecycle maturity, historical contracted pricing and migration to managed document services. Private author-supplied material; figures are not reused as fragrance evidence.

## [10] Ole Sandner supplied reference. Project Skyscraper Business Case.

16 November 2013. Sections on market context, enterprise engagement, partner capability and delivery governance. Historical private reference; no historic partner is represented as a current fragrance partner.

## [11] Ellen MacArthur Foundation. Circular economy principles.

21 August 2024. General principles of waste elimination, circulation at high value and regeneration. Source for principles only; no publisher diagram is reproduced.

[Open source](#)

## [12] Supplied reference deck. Organizational alignment framework strategic development requirements.

Undated. Governance, capability, incentives and cross-functional alignment themes. Contains generic placeholders; used for analytical prompts, not evidence of achieved organisational maturity.

## [13] Ole Sandner. CV dated June 2025.

Private author-supplied CV. Supports cloud-services, subscription and partner-channel experience. Earlier job dates are superseded here by the supplied October 2026 profile.

## [14] Author-supplied LinkedIn profile screenshot. Three executive positions.

Screenshot dated 12 October 2026. Supports the three role groupings and their dates; author name follows the brief and CV.

## Calculation notes

Figure 3: operating profit = revenue - cost of goods - other operating costs. Figure 4: cumulative expected cash at month  $T = -I + m \times [1 - (1 - c)^T] / c$ .  $I = \text{EUR } 200$  and  $m = \text{EUR } 12$ . First-month contribution precedes end-of-month churn. Survival at month  $t = (1 - c)^{(t-1)}$ . Real-world modelling should use observed cohort survival, discount rates, taxes, fixed costs, financing and recovery outcomes.

The supplied lifecycle image is not reproduced or traced. Role groupings follow the October 2026 profile rather than the older CV. Personal residential details are excluded. No fragrance device, deployment architecture or committed technology partnership is presented.

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